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Opening 
Lotze’s Microcosm  was published in three volumes, in 1856, 1858 and 1864,  
respectively. It was soon one of the most widely read philosophy books of the 
time. It was translated into French and Russian immediately, into English in 
1885/87, and into Italian in 1911/16. The book saw six editions in Germany alone by 
1923. Its last editor, Raymund Schmidt, wrote in his preface “Lotze will never be 
a modern [author] again, we shall never evidence a neo-Lotzeanism or something 
of the sort, but [his Microcosm] will always be read as a part of the education of 
young philosophers and for deepening the education of every thinking man”.  
Unfortunately, this prophecy proved false. After the Great War in the English-
speaking world, and after 1929 in Germany, Lotze (1817–1881) was almost to-
tally forgotten. My guess is that the reason was the analytic-continental divide in 
philosophy,  which reigned for the last eighty years with almost uncompromising 
insensitivity. Forgetting all other styles of doing their discipline, philosophers en-
thusiastically sided with one of the two camps. This, of course, is highly ironical, 
since Lotze can be considered the grandfather of both analytic philosophy and 
phenomenology.  My hope is that with the end of the schism—now on the hori-
zon—Lotze’s philosophy in general, and his Microcosm in particular, will experi-
ence the revival they surely deserve. Here I shall revisit this work with the aim of 
excerpting from it interesting points for the reader of today. I shall do this in two 
steps. In Part One I shall describe the leading ideas, the method(s), and the history 
of the work. In Part Two I shall pass through some of its particular themes. 
Part One 
Set-Up and First Characterization 
The incidental reader of Lotze’s Microcosm today will be surprised by the fresh-
ness of this work. Its very content is exciting. It shows a book which discusses 
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themes which are today almost forgotten; or it puts prima facie alien themes side 
by side, inspiring deep insight. Briefly, in Microcosm Lotze charts a map of phi-
losophy which is rather alien—in an exciting way—to contemporary philosophers. 
The three volumes of the book discuss, respectively, the Body, Man, and  
History; or, the physiological person, the social person, and society as such. In the 
volume on the psychological person, her stream of consciousness is discussed  
(in the second book on Soul). The first volume ends with an examination of life in 
its different forms. In the second volume on man, first her relatedness to and 
differences from other animals are investigated. It follows an analysis of mind in 
which a special stress is put on a person’s sensuality and feeling of pleasure and 
pain. This analysis prompts Lotze to make consumption (genießen) a central con-
cept in anthropology. His discussion of man continues in chapters on language 
and thinking and on knowing and truth. Finally, the author examines man in his 
macrocosmic (terrestrial and cosmic), as well as in his microcosmic (in his rela-
tion to other people in family and society) environment. In the final volume, on 
history, Lotze examines progress, different cultures and forms of life, private and 
political economy, different forms of work and leisure, and art. The volume ends 
with Lotze’s philosophy of religion. 
We can see Microcosm, among other things,  as a book in popular philosophy. 
An example of this is Lotze’s examination of the differences and relatedness be-
men. Women get accustomed to new environments more easily, whereas men 
eliminate the traces of their early education and formation only with much effort. 
Further, the intellectual capacities of the two genders are not substantially different. 
Rather, more often than not they use them for different purposes, and with  
different attitudes. Roughly, men’s knowledge and will are directed to the general, 
have preference for the living, for coziness (Gemütlichkeit), for the beautiful, for 
closed wholes. Women are good at bringing order in space, men in time. Property 
is what is important for men, while women often live wastefully. To a woman’s 
heart the truth has another meaning than for men. Women are inclined to accept 
appearances; they have predilection for surrogates. 
Being an essay in popular philosophy, the book was a break in what Schopen-
hauer had called Kathederphilosophie, the university philosophy that dominated 
post-Kantian Germany. The latter was rather scholastic, far away from the general 
conversation of mankind. I deem it enlightening to see Microcosm (1856–64) as 
the middle member of a chain of books which appeared in mid-nineteenth-century 
Germany, the other two members of which were the second volume of Schopen-
hauer’s The World as Will and Idea (1844), and Nietzsche’s first philosophical 
book Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik (1872). All three books 
were essays in popular philosophy. 
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tween man and woman:  The corporal needs of women are less than those of 
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The Place of the Microcosm in Lotze’s Philosophical Development 
The place of the Microcosm in Lotze’s philosophical development was judged dif-
ferently in the literature. Some authors (for example, J E Erdmann, E W Orth) be-
lieve that this was his most important book.
book was only a popular statement of his philosophy which was developed on a 
more theoretical level in his Logic (1874) and Metaphysics (1879). 
We can get a more objective perspective on this point if we trace out the place 
of this book in his philosophical development. To cut a long story short, a key for 
understanding this book-project is the fact that Lotze had earned two doctorates, 
in two fields: medicine, and philosophy. Further, he became a Privatdozent (re-
ceived a venia legendi) in these two disciplines and even practiced as a medical 
doctor for a year in Zittau. Lotze’s career in philosophy can be seen as being pro-
grammed by this double qualification. It is true that he chose academic philosophy 
as a profession. However, the influence of his medical training was felt all the 
scientific exactness: Lotze criticized any whiff of mysticism or speculative inspi-
ration. Secondly, he devoted many academic years to—more or less philosophic—
his grounding works in psychology which give reason to celebrate him today as 
one of this field’s founding fathers. 
We can see this trait of Lotze’s work simply by making a quick review of his 
publications. At first Lotze published, at the age of 24 and 26, respectively, his 
‘small’ Metaphysics (1841) and ‘small’ Logic (1843), in which he charted his 
philosophical program. His Habilitation in medicine was published in the same 
period under the title Allgemeine Pathologie und Therapie als mechanische 
Naturwissenschaften (1842). In the next ten years Lotze worked on problems lying on 
the edge between medicine and philosophy, in particular, on the relation between 
soul and body. The results of these studies were published in two books: Allge-
meine Physiologie des körperlichen Lebens (1851) and Medicinische Psychologie 
oder Physiologie der Seele (1852). In these years Lotze also published extensive 
essays on “Leben. Lebenskraft” (1843), “Instinct” (1844), and “Seele und 
Seelenleben” (1846).  In the late 1840s he published important works on aesthet-
ics: “Über den Begriff der Schönheit” (1845), “Über Bedingungen der 
Kunstschönheit” (1847), and “Quaestiones Lucretianae” (1852). 
Microcosm marked a new period in Lotze’s philosophical development. In this 
monumental work, he made a synthesis of his ideas advanced so far: of the logico-
metaphysical ideas of 1841–43, of his psychological ideas of 1842–52, and of his 
aesthetic ideas of 1845–52. This means that—and we are going to see this in the 
lines to come—the book was not simply a popular treatise. It also developed most 
serious (deep and technical) logical and metaphysical ideas in a form that was  
unknown in his theoretical project from 1841–43. 
Shortly after Lotze finished Microcosm, he started his System of Philosophy 
which consisted of his ‘large’ Logic (1874), and ‘large’ Metaphysics (1879). The 
third part of the system on Ethic/Aesthetics/Religious Philosophy, remained unfin-
ished. Roughly, the difference between these two book-projects can be set out 
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thusly: whereas Microcosm was something of an encyclopedia of philosophical 
deliberations on human life —private and pubic—the System was an encyclopedia 
of the philosophical disciplines. 
Three Traditions of Microcosmic Studies 
Surprisingly enough, the very term ‘microcosm’ was used only three times in the 
book, and not in its body but: (a) in the Introductory Remark to the whole work; 
(b) in the Conclusion to Volume One; and (c) in the Contents of Book Six, Chapter 
One—interestingly, in the chapter itself he did not made use of it. In (b) and (c) 
Lotze speaks of the microcosm as ‘the lesser world’. Now, why was Lotze so shy 
about speaking of microcosm? My guess is that this was a measure taken against 
the danger that his work might be conceived in the old German tradition of micro-
cosmic studies à la Paracelsus and Jacob Böhme. 
In this connection I should remind the reader that there are, at least, three tradi-
tions of microcosmic study. (1) The first one, much more popular than the other 
two, accepts that men—or other lesser monads—and universe “are constructed ac-
cording to the same harmonic proportions, each sympathetically attuned to the 
other, each a cosmos ordered according to reason. By an imaginative leap, the 
universe itself [i]s thought to be, like man, living and conscious, a divine creature 
whose nature it reflected in human existence .”  This idea stresses the unity of  
all life and thought in the world. Many philosophers connect such an idea of  
microcosm with the idea of the World Soul, which, in this or that way, controls, or 
animates, particular (lesser) souls. The Orphic, Gnostic, Cabbalistic and Hermetic 
traditions made use of it, connecting it with mysticism, pantheism and the occult. 
As already noted, this idea of microcosm was considered a hallmark of German 
philosophy, of what was called philosophia teutonica. Nicholas of Cusa, Jacob 
Böhme, Agrippa of Nettesheim, Paracelsus, Leibniz, Herbart, and later also Max 
Scheler, all accepted a kind of micro-cosmology which claims that the lesser 
worlds are controlled by the big world which, in turn, leads the life of the lesser 
worlds. Lotze’s project had a different focus and goal. 
(2) Cosmos also means order in Greek. So microcosm can in addition signify 
“any part of a thing, especially a living thing, that reflects or represents the whole 
it belongs to, whenever there is a mirroring relation between the whole and each 
of its parts .”  On this principle are built many sciences—and pseudo-sciences. I 
would like to remind the reader here of Astrology which claims that the fate of a 
person, in a period of time, is influenced by her co-relation to such macro-worlds 
as planets, stars, constellations, etc. In contemporary medicine such microcosmical 
relations are ubiquitous. Two examples: (a) in neurology, parts of the brain 
represent different parts of the body or its abilities (speech, orientation); (b) the 
main idea of acupuncture is that small parts of the surface of the human body are 
representatives of inner organs of the body. 
(3) Finally, in Greek, cosmos means a unity, ordered according to certain 
principles. As we shall see in the lines to come, it is exactly in this sense that 
Lotze spoke of microcosm. He investigated how the microcosm of the human 
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ordered exactly like the macrocosm. With the purpose of elucidating this point 
further, I shall turn back to the history of Lotze’s Microcosm.
Before doing this, however, I must mention a puzzling moment in this work 
which quasi refutes our thesis. In the Conclusion to Volume One, Lotze speaks of 
microcosm in the following sense:”that perfect picture [vollkommenes Abbild] of 
the big reality, the lesser world, the microcosm”.  In order to elucidate this place 
of Lotze’s Microcosm, I shall compare it with another one, in which the author 
specifies that the man is not a picture (Abbild) of nature, but rather a living point
which receives innumerable perceptions from the world, not in order to reflect it 
in the same form, however, but in order to be stimulated from it according to her 
own disposition (Naturell).
The History of Lotze’s Microcosm-Project 
The history of Lotze’s Microcosm  is long and well-documented. Already in 
1844, the author suggested to his editor, Hirzel, a book-project for an Anthropology 
and Natural History of Human Race—this in connection with a project for an  
encyclopedia of medicinal sciences. Soon, however, Lotze gave the idea up. 
His reason was that the theme of this project lies between medicine, philosophy, 
theology, and natural science, and so was an unfeasible task. Six years later, in 
1850, Hirzel tried to persuade him to bring the project back to life, but Lotze re-
fused. Surprisingly enough, during his visit to Göttingen in the winter of 1852–53, 
Hirzel convinced him to undertake it. Hirzel’s new idea was to end the book with 
a Chapter on the “Developing History of Human Culture”. Lotze agreed immedi-
ately and in a March 8, 1853 letter to Hirzel drew up a plan for his new book.
Lotze, however, needed much time in order to call it Microcosm. Indeed, the ti-
tle Microcosm appeared first, in relation to this project, in his letter to Hirzel from 
good .” As a matter of fact, he embraced the metaphor of microcosm as a method 
for investigating in anthropology when writing the already mentioned Allgemeine 
Physiologie des körperliches Leben (1851) and Medicinische Psychologie oder 
Physiologie der Seele (1852). He realized that the analysis of microcosm in the 
light of the cosmos is logically much more strict than the deduction of the forms 
of life from the logical forms as accomplished by the speculative natural science 
of Hegel and Schelling.  What was important to him was that the microcosm 
works according to the order of the macrocosm: they follow the same  
with the macrocosm, or vice versa. 
This approach shows, with formal precision, the way the microcosm repeats the 
indefinite idea of the macrocosm. More to the point, it demonstrates that “if we 
understand the organism as a microcosm, then, according to Lotze, we can grasp 
the importance of life through a trait of its behavior, which must in fact express 
only a formal expediency of [it . . .], without necessarily determining or imagining 
its content .”  This trait of its behavior was its mechanism or order. 
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world—physiological, private, social—is ordered; and he discovered that it is 
October 2, 1854, where he also noted: “I am not sure it is [the title] silly, or rather 
mechanism—not that we can make conclusions about the microcosm in analogy 
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Ontological Approach 
In the section above we have already seen that central to Lotze’s Microcosm is  
order, the social order in particular. Here I would like to note that such an approach 
to examining society was embraced only in recent years. Its first champion was 
Eric Voegelin who created an extensive review (in five volumes) of human history 
from the point of view of different levels of order adopted in it.  Quite recently, 
another author declared the concept of social order, together with that of  
social practices, central to social philosophy.  This point suggests that Lotze’s 
Microcosm has a strong ontological stance in the sense that the book shows “a 
concern with ontological structure”.  More precisely, in the book Lotze examined 
the development of human life according to the type of order, or ontological 
(geometrical) volume in which it is involved. Here is an example of this approach. 
The savage changes passive, prolonged leisure with extremely intensive strain. 
In contrast, the settled peasant lives a rhythmic series of small portions of work 
and leisure. Her heart melts with the nearby landscape, making a home (Heimat) 
of it. She grows more patient as she gets accustomed to awaiting the reaping of the 
crop, following the four seasons, the rhythm of the nature. Such things teach the 
mind to feel involved in the consequential, but branched, lawfulness of nature.  
Family life also changes the mind. In the family house; the person is isolated 
from outer perceptions and concentrates on intensive contact with family  
members. The walls of the house enclose a new realm of human imagination. 
 
In the wild life of savages, men and women accomplish their typical work 
separately: men go hunting, women stay home to bring up the children. Genders 
develop and manifest their true abilities, men’s power and women’s soul, only  
in their work together, in mutual complementation realized in more developed  
society. 
Something similar can be said about the different generations. Indeed, whereas 
in the wild life, the new generation separates from the old immediately after 
physical maturity, the new generation of settled society often develops tasks and 
projects started by the old one. The result is interwoven souls, with common 
interests, but also with different characters and direction of imagination. This leads to 
conflicts of wishes, hopes, and fears, but also to spiritual enrichment. There is  
no surprise about this: the members of any family have a chorus of endlessly rich 
  
The “drama of life”, however, would be colorless if the family remained at home. The 
family needs glances and evaluations from the outside; it needs the recognition of 
other families, of society.  
Ecological Stance 
Besides the ontological approach, the book also has specific ecological orienta-
tions. Indeed, we must not forget that Lotze planned his Microcosm as a super-
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23interests, only a small part of which comes  to the surface of consciousness.
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structure to Herder’s Ideen zur Geschichte der Menschheit (1784/91), and to von 
Humboldt’s Cosmos (1845/62), both written, at least in part, in geographic terms. 
Here is an excerpt of Lotze’s ecology: 
The shaping (Gestaltung) of the ground and the coloring of the sky immediately reflects 
on the temperament and the national imagination of the denizens of every country. On the 
other hand, all revolutions in human history had as a consequence a radical change in the 
life of the earth .”
Nevertheless, direct conclusions from cosmic to human life, or vice versa, are not 
reliable. You cannot infer the underdevelopment of the black race from the brightness 
of the sun in Africa, or the monotony of tropical life; or the fact that the black conti-
nent has too few inlets; or too small a number of navigable rivers, or just a few moun-
tains. At the same time, Lotze underscores “how advantageous for the heart the simul-
taneous overview of huge spaces is; what a pleasure the ability to review a multiplicity 
of different objects in their reciprocal positions, as if embedded in a secure mesh of re-
lations, is .”  Geography influences spiritual dispositions (Naturell), not by what it is, 
fluences is to reveal the mediating steps.
Concluding this section, I would like to note that the ecological approach in  
social philosophy has been explored in depth only in recent years. According to 
Barry Smith, the central concept of social philosophy is that of the niche in which 
the object fits.
human civilization “as a type of relationship, a relationship to the natural envi-
ronment, recrafted by the civilizing impulse, to meet human demands .”  The 
dled their environments so roughly as to have broken them. 
Theoretical Liberalism 
Lotze was against the hasty (apparent) satisfaction of our theoretical needs and 
expectations through one-sided theories. Instead, he introduced a method of 
discussing different views (Ansichten) on the subject under scrutiny. He even 
claimed that his final solutions were nothing but views which satisfy “needs of the 
heart”. That phrase had a sense of both a pathological finding and a critical stan-
dard.  Incidentally, this point can be comfortably interpreted in the sense of 
Freud and Wittgenstein. Here I mean Wittgenstein’s claim that philosophical ob-
sessions are similar to mental neuroses, which need therapy consisting in realizing 
the true use of language. 
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main thesis of this author is that all civilizations collapse because they have han-
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but by how it affects the still uneducated heart. Most important in examining such in-
 Another recent author is more concretely ecological. He defines 
From here it follows that values are equipollent. Lotze treats every epoch of 
: a) the Orient developed 
a taste for the colossal, b) the Jews for the elevated,  c) the Greeks for the beautiful,  
d) the Romans for dignity and elegance, e) the Middle Ages for the fantastic and 
characteristic, and f) Modernity for the critical and inventive. These orientations 
 Especially in political philosophy, 
the acceptance of the plurality of values was unique in German philosophy at the 
human culture as developed around a particular value
and achievements are on a par with one another.
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The Kernel of the Project: Reciprocal Analysis 
The declared objective of Lotze’s Microcosm was a “reflection on the meaning of 
our human  being [Dasein]”. urgency  of this task was a consequence of  
the scientific and industrial revolution of the beginning and the middle of the  
nineteenth century. That revolution dramatically changed the way in which  
humans imagine the cosmos and universe. It eroded the unity of God and humanity. 
Traditional mythology proved inconsistent. As a consequence, the world started to 
seem alien, cold, immense. A substantial change in religious belief followed. 
Lotze saw danger in the numerous attempts (on the side of the mechanic  
philosopher–scientists like Georg Büchner, Heinrich Czolbe, Franz Fick, Jacob 
Moleschott and Karl Vogt) to prove that the microcosm of human beings is 
 His  objective was to disprove such at-
tempts and to make people feel at home in the world again. This objective moti-
vated Lotze to articulate his conception “in completely popular form”. 
Lotze’s first principle was mechanicism, which claims that all processes and 
movements—physical, biological, psychical, bodily, social, ethical, cultural—are 
accomplished in a way that can be described mechanically. Further, mechanical 
processes are realized in interaction (Wechselwirkung). In a sense, mechanism and 
interaction are two sides of one thing—they always go together. 
Accepting this principle, Lotze eschewed any reference to ‘deep’ explanations 
(such as vitalism in the philosophy of biology), interpretations, and other sorts of 
speculation.
that we can deduce facts of reality from general forms. In contrast, Lotze insisted 
that, when theorizing, we are obliged to recurrently refer to reality and to experi-
ment. On this point, he was, without a doubt, influenced by his education as a 
medical doctor. 
However, the mechanism is not the final solution in science—it is only its 
means. Moreover, mechanism contains in itself the indication of something 
higher.
themselves in the world. On the theoretical side, mechanism is simply a method of 
research; it is not a fundamental explanation of life and mind. Indeed, our ideas 
of forces and natural laws of science do not say how the things in nature really 
function. To understand this, we must connect them with the realm of the trans-
sensual (Übersinnliche).
and essential being”, which places us in a position to understand the processes in 
these mechanisms.
what exactly does it mean? 
Now, contrary to his contemporary anthropology, Lotze did not seek to explain 
man in terms of the devices which men produce. Rather, for him, the keys for un-
derstanding the human race are the results of human education and schooling 
(Bildung), as they were developed in history. This means that his philosophical 
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33time. So from Herder and Kant we can easily find anti-Semitic judgments— not
from Lotze. 
34 The  
merely  mechanical,  or  materialistic.
Here he meant above all Hegel’s intellectualism, which claimed 
It is precisely the trans-sensual realm, the “higher 
Lotze himself called this conception ‘teleomechanism’. But 
It  can also be understood as the way in which purposes realize  
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examination started backwards, from the history of culture, to logic and  
metaphysics.  Its method was that of regression analysis.
So, it is from the history of culture that Lotze tried to understand how science, 
mathematics and logic function. More precisely, he believed that the main 
educational goods (Bildungsgüter), which cannot be substituted by science, are 
generally conveyed by poetry and religion. They supply a “higher perspective 
on the things”, or the “point of view of the heart”. This means that the mechanism
which science explicates is not the only key to understanding the world; it is even 
not the most important key. Science became a science with a human face only as a 
unity and in connection with the historically developed values and forms of 
schooling and education. 
But how exactly can the history of culture command the shape of logic, meta-
physics and science? The answer is: through the ideal ethical value, logical valid-
ity, and aesthetic worth. Being identifiable magnitudes, these idealities serve as 
concepts of orientation. The spatial order is also such an ideality. Following Kant, 
Lotze claims that they pertain to the original mental reality, not to material reality. 
However, they need matter in order to be explicated. That explains why we do not 
 We   
understand them only in experience, as “secondary thoughts” (Nebengedanken). 
Further, in the same way, we derive from experience validities and values. It is 
and in our feelings of pleasure and displeasure. We find them further in ethics, 
aesthetics, science, mathematics, metaphysics and logic. 
We must remember, however, that “the scientist can go after an worldview-
philosophical orienting only when he reaches problems of foundations and 
bounds”.
the processes in the world. We must thus see the construction of the world (der 
Weltbau)
this rule. At the same time, we must know that the meaning of this understanding 
is only secondary.
In this sense Lotze was convinced that the quarrel between materialism and 
idealism is quite superfluous. It is a quarrel about meaning: Idealists see too much 
meaning in reality, while materialists see no meaning in it at all. Lotze was con-
vinced that aesthetics and religion (poetry and religious faith) are completely 
compatible with the calculationism of the materialists. All fears that the  
acceptance of the aesthetic elements in science and philosophy will make exact 
scientific concepts vague are in vain. On the other hand, the acceptance  
philosophy—in particular, it does not invalidate the belief in free will, as many 
speculative philosophers believe it does. On the contrary. It only “increased the 
poetical appeal of the world”
trans-sensual more strenuous. 
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of utmost importance that such idealities are at work already in our sensual life 
of the mechanism as a main principle cannot erode the comfort that we seek in 
have a priori notions of bad and good, as well as of blue and sweet.
Up to this point, the mechanism is sine qua non for understanding 
only, and exclusively, in mechanical terms; there is no exception to 
 since it made the spiritual effort to achieve the 
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Lotze’s Anthropological Revolution in Philosophy 
Lotze did not introduce anthropological investigation in philosophy. It was started 
in the sixteenth century, in an effort to renovate theology. During the next three 
centuries, anthropology became a favorite subject among German university  
philosophers—including Kant. In his anthropology, however, Lotze did not 
follow Kant. Indeed, already in his small Logic, he abolished Kant’s discrimination 
between theoretical  and  mundane  philosophy.  In fact,  he developed his  
anthropology exactly in order to converge the two disciplines into one. Lotze 
made this the center of his interest in the concrete person, situated in a concrete 
environment. 
More to the point, the main objective of the Microcosm was the investigation of 
the concrete man with her imaginings, dreams and feelings. Lotze considered 
these elements — as expressed in poetry and art — as constitutive to a human per-
son and her life. This explains the central role that the concept of home (Heimat)
Now, despite the fact that the concept of heart was introduced in the wake of 
German  mysticism (of Meister Eckhart and Jacob Böhme),  Lotze used it in a 
quite realistic sense. Heart is what makes us long for home. The longing is a result 
of our needs which we strive to satisfy. Life consists, above all, in consuming (ge-
nießen) goods. This point of view on human life is, of course, close to hedonism. 
We can conclude that the main objective of Lotze’s investigation was to reach a 
maximally true account of reality.
cosm greatly influenced young philosophers of the time such as Wilhelm Dilthey. 
Indeed, on Christmas 1858, the latter (then 25) noted in his Notebook: “The sec-
ond volume of Lotze’s Microcosm had really grasped me. This is a marvelous 
book.” 
stress on the individual and her concrete life.  From this starting point, Dilthey 
developed his philosophy of life. 
In this sense Lotze argued that Kant’s question “what can I know?” cannot be 
answered in isolation; it can be only answered in terms of concrete persons.
Only when we embrace this perspective can we also grasp the depth and the im-
portance of metaphysical problems. Lotze’s revolution in philosophy consists in 
the fact that he started to discuss metaphysics in an anthropological perspective; 
he thus made philosophy anthropological. This means that Lotze did not simply 
shift from metaphysics to anthropology. Rather, his anthropology became  
philosophy proper.
Part Two 
In part two of my paper I shall review the major individual themes of Lotze’s 
Microcosm. My objective will be to demonstrate the way he treated specific  
problems in the book. 
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feeling, or heart (Gemüt),  as different from mind (Geist) and soul (Seele).
It is no surprise, therefore, that Lotze’s Micro-
51 Apparently, Lotze was attractive to Dilthey with his realism which puts 
plays in the ontology of the book. The related concept in its philosophy of mind is 
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Language and Ethics 
Starting with his small Logic, Lotze made enormous efforts to elaborate a  
convincing philosophy of language. His first step in this direction was to connect 
language with logic. In particular, he claimed that logic begins with exploring 
language forms.  The reason for this assumption was that exactly the living, un-
conscious spirit of language throws a bridge between the immediate sensitivity 
and the logical and metaphysical definition of the forms.  His next claim was that 
all forms of metaphysics exist through the forms of language. 
Lotze criticized the understanding of language as picturing. Language does not 
make pictures of reality but is something of a method, of a rule for cognitive 
(mental) acting. In fact, the whole relation between microcosm and macrocosm is 
understood by Lotze in this intensive manner. The microcosm is quasi a language 
of the macrocosm, and at the same time, a place for understanding the possibilities 
of speaking about the macrocosm.  
As a matter of fact, even the pictures by perceiving are not pictures proper. Be 
this as it may, the language of perceptions is our language as such. We use this 
language also for conveying truths of a higher order: truths of science, mathemat-
ics, logic, etc.  
Ethics. Lotze’s predecessor at the Philosophy Chair in Göttingen, J F Herbart, 
embraced the explanatory style in philosophy. His starting point was the given: 
i.e., he opened his philosophical explorations with analysis of the appearances and 
of the objects of inner and outer experience which are given in immediate  
consciousness.  The being was for Herbart real—beyond and independent from 
the world of ideas. From here followed a strict division between theoretical and 
practical philosophy—reality and values, being and ought, are independent one from 
another. 
Lotze’s answer to Herbart was: it is true that we cannot make conclusions from 
being to ought; we, however, can make conclusions from ought to being. That is 
why, as he put it in his small Metaphysics, metaphysics starts from ethics. Of 
course, ethics is not presented in metaphysics in substantial form. Rather, it is a 
judgment about which possibilities of ordering of the relations between the things 
correspond to an ideally presupposed order.  In this sense, there is no knowledge 
without presuppositions: “Every person, every generation poses questions not just 
to the being in its reality in itself, but in connection with the sense and value, in 
which the being confronts them through the life and history .”  
This form of intuitivism explains why Lotze avoided Kant’s formalistic 
grounding of the categorical imperative. Instead, following Fries, he accepted a 
psychological basis of the maxims of ethics. He, more precisely, claimed that we 
draw our moral principles from the immediate certainty with which we consider 
something as true or good.  
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Soul and Body 
According to Lotze, the soul is a scientific assumption; it is connected with the 
Principle of Explaining psychical phenomena which brings into being the ‘con-
sciousness’ as a theoretical construction. This means that soul is not a substance. 
It appears as a substance only because of its connections to memory. 
The way in which phenomena are explained in physics is not appropriate  
for the psychical world.  Indeed, we cannot say why we feel the effects of the 
light-waves as color, or of the sound-waves as tones. In this sense Lotze criticized 
Herbart’s explanation of the interaction of ideas in mind with their strength. Such 
an account is borrowed from the physical conception of force. In truth, the content 
of ideas is more important than their intensity.  For example, a faint noise can 
distract our attention from a loud din. 
About the relation between soul and body, Lotze assumed a form of occasion-
alism. However, his occasionalism is rather practical—differing from the  
metaphysical version of Malebranche. This means that it is not a positive theory 
about the relation between body and soul—in fact, Lotze denies the possibility 
of its knowledge. His occasionalism is rather a methodological theory about how, 
despite this ignorance, we can gain the main concepts of the theory about the 
relation between body and soul which are necessary by investigating the composition 
of its elements. When taken in isolation, these elements are obscure and vague.  
Lotze’s occasionalism anticipated the today widespread (especially in America) 
understanding of the psychical as a function of the physical. He further conceived 
this function as a form of interaction—in particular, as based on a causal connec-
tion which is the presupposition of all interactions. 
In order to explain how matter is connected with mind, specifically by perceiv-
ing space and movement, Lotze introduced his famous conception of local-signs. 
What we directly see when perceiving a movement are only patches of color. 
What helps us to perceive the fact of movement is the strain which we make in 
order to perceive the movement. Lotze calls exactly this stimulus local sign. It is a 
means of transforming sense-perceptions into space-values. This transformation 
occurs as a conveying of signals, not of energy. 
This means that for the connection of mind to matter it is not a fruit of reflec-
tion but of activity (in this assumption Lotze followed Kant again). Indeed, the 
process of space-perceiving is an activity of reconstruction of the external objects, 
and events, in consciousness.  It is not simply a matter of grasping. Ostensibly, 
this conception was another blow against the purely mechanical understanding in 
philosophy. 
Philosophy of Nature 
As a young man Lotze was a close friend with Ernst Friedrich Apelt, a pupil of 
Jacob Friedrich Fries. Lotze even visited Fries in May or June 1840 in Jena. Soon 
he was made acquainted with Fries’ system which, similarly to that of Weiße, 
“became an occasion for productive criticism and, in this sense, was important to 
63
64
65
66
   53 
Lotze .”  Fries’ philosophy,  to remind the reader, formally followed Kant, but in 
fact was even more “mechanical” and calculative than Herbart’s philosophy was. 
However, if philosophy wants to be the spirit of its time, and she must be this, she 
cannot be based on formal schemes alone.
Specifically, Lotze criticized Fries’ (and Kant’s) dynamic understanding of 
matter. It conceives of the matter simply as an interplay of powers. In this way 
physical properties disappear. Against this understanding, Lotze embraced a form 
of atomism.
Besides, Lotze was convinced that the order in the world cannot come into being 
from a purposeless and planless beginning—from an atomless gunk. 
Lotze did not understand atoms as they were understood in antiquity: as last 
elements of reality which have different forms, but the same substance. “Atoms 
were thus [understood] not [as] simple elements, but [as] indivisible systems with 
 In contrast, he conceived of them as the logical atomists later have 
done: as the ultimate building blocks of the world which are idiosyncratic and re-
main unmodified in all compositions and divisions. Further, Lotze’s atoms were 
punctual (unräumlich), without extension. To be sure, extension is possible only 
where there are many points which can be easily identified and differentiated. The 
extensionless atoms find their mutual place in space through their powers.
Through their resistance, they create the impression that they are impermeable 
and that they fill up the space.
The most important characteristic of the matter is the ability to suffer.
Indeed, only if two essences mutually effect their respective sufferings can they 
be  their  respective interacting  causes.  At the same time Lotze was adamant  
that the concepts of suffering, effecting, and interaction are only—although ines-
capable—scientific metaphors.  We must not conceive of them literally. 
In questions of space, Lotze criticized his teacher Weiße again. Among other 
things, the latter made use of two categories: interaction (Wechselwirkung) and 
space, which he considered completely different. Lotze, in opposition, was  
convinced that the two coincide. For Weiße, the interaction is the condition  
but between extension and place. ‘Extension’ refers to an infinite multiplicity of 
possible directions. Only the place makes these possibilities concrete, putting 
them into three coordinated directions.
We have already mentioned that following Kant, Lotze claimed that space and 
time (and also movement) are subjective forms of intuition; so these forms cannot 
be deduced from a third one. That is why the categories of space and time, to-
gether with the category of being, pertain to the beginning of philosophy. Space 
and time are thus pre-forms of the being, as well as instruments of thinking.
Zoology, Anthropology 
We have already noted that Lotze’s problem in Microcosm was to fix man’s place 
in nature.
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Lotze criticized him as too formal a philosopher who forgets the deep problems. 
A bove all, atomism is important for the Principle of Individuation. 
In contrast, Lotze differentiated, not between interaction and space, 
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Hegel had once done. Lotze also criticized Hegel’s ladder-model of natural his-
tory, which claimed that we can entail the value and importance of every species 
from its range on the ladder of evolution. Indeed, this claim is scarcely of any 
cognitive value. 
Instead of formal ranging of living species, Lotze advances a comparison of 
their figures (Gestalten). More to the point, he classified animals not according to 
their capacity to think (as Herder did), but according to their physical performance 
and forms of consumption (genießen). “To know the man means, above all, to 
know his [her] destination [Bestimmung], the means which [s]he has in disposition 
In this kind of anthropology, the ability to use the arm, and later also instruments 
was most important in the history of man.
The most essential difference between man’s mind and that of animals is that 
men refer to their tradition: in language, science, technique, morals, as well as in 
practical habits  and in judgments of everyday life.  The very difference between 
the mind of animals and that of man arises not because of a difference in  
the elements which they contain; in fact, here and there the same mosaic-stones 
(Mosaikstifte)  enter  into the picture.  Rather,  that difference results from the 
way in which we combine them and use them.
Getting back to the tradition of the German Enlightenment in rehabilitating the 
importance of sensuality, of feelings, and imagination (Phantasie), in matters of 
pure anthropology, Lotze again criticized the intellectualism of the German Ideal-
ists. On this point he was criticized by many of his contemporaries, including his 
the Microcosm too little idealism and too much realism.
Social Progress 
Achieving progress is not a matter of finding a new order but of reaching a “sys-
tematic complete harmony” in this or that particular culture. It could be achieved, 
for example, if the rules of social conduct are transformed into a system of  
 This  society could be 
contemplated as a work of Nature, “or rather not simply of Nature, but of the 
Moral World Order [sittliche Weltordnung] which is independent of the individ-
ual”.
Lotze was not sure that the apparent progress of the human race made in the 
first half of the nineteenth century really meant an increase of humanity in society. 
It is true that today we understand nature much better than one thousand years 
ago. This, however, is mainly due to the fact that the professional work which 
men now perform requires new kinds of plans and so makes people sensitive to 
the value of success (Gelingen).
lowing specific characteristic of humans: they have absolutely no envy of future 
generations and are even ready to sacrifice themselves for them.
It is true that such progress increased the power of man over nature. But it is 
questionable whether this was profitable for human life. The point is that parallel 
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to the extended domination over nature, man also became increasingly dependent 
on it. Above all, the new way of life created new consumption needs. Perhaps 
many new needs are superfluous; they, however, cannot be eliminated through 
mere insight into this truth.
Rousseau or Diogenes of Sinop, is attractive and plausible only as a critique, not 
per se. Indeed, the natural state, which they propagated, can be seen as a state of 
innocence, but also one of barbarism. 
As a solution to this conundrum Lotze accepts that there is a constant human 
way of life which repeats itself practically unchanged—with purposes, motives 
and habits of the same form. This is the course of the world (der Weltlauf), the 
same always-green shoot from which colorful blossoms of history shoot up  
all the time in cycles. The true goods of our inner life increase either only slowly, 
or perhaps they do not increase at all.  
Of course, we are inclined to think that there is one direction of progress which 
leads to final ends. This, however, is not necessarily the case. It is true that the 
“higher world” is now more clear to us than five centuries ago. However, the 
strength with which the heart clings to it remains the same. Lotze’s objective is to 
find out—in the nature of human heart and mind—the available means with 
whose help Providence works in history.  
The most interesting characteristic of our time is the division of work and the 
(protestant) phenomenon of profession. An important effect of this development is 
that life is now divided into work and leisure. Unfortunately, leisure is now 
shorter than man had once hoped it would be. This makes the man of today doubt 
whether his official life is the true life.  
Every profession stimulates the heart to embody a peculiar temperament, 
specific direction of imagination, a perspective on the world, a way of judging, 
specific habitus. Of course, the monotony of professional life has its disadvantages. 
Nevertheless, the colorfulness of different ways of existence (Existenzarten) 
makes modernity one of the most interesting epochs of human history.  
Philosophy of History 
A central subject of Microcosm is the history of man and society. What is the 
sense of human history? Lotze is inclined to see history in a spiral development. 
Many achievements of society disappear without a trace; these, or something 
perspective on history as rather gloomy—a contraposition to the glorious picture 
of history, delivered by the mainstream historians of the time. 
In particular, Lotze criticized modern rationalism in history (of Leopold von Ranke 
and Johann Gustav Droysen) which overestimated both facts and forms. Instead, he 
praised the poetic approach to history.  Indeed, poetry and history have much in 
common: above all, they are both creative. The danger of a joint approach of this kind 
is the inclination to accept that the events of history are effects of ideas. 
The ideas of history are to be conceived, not in their meaning for today, but exactly 
as they were embraced, felt, and consumed in the past. The historian  
 The disapproving stance on this matter, taken by 89
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similar to them, are reintroduced by new societies. That point reveals Lotze’s 
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must find out how the problem was seen by concrete agents, in different times, 
and at different geographic sites.
proved a threat to Lotze’s Microcosm-project: he soon found out that the part of 
the book which treated history could fill several volumes. Faced with this prob-
lem, Lotze decided to end the book, practically, unfinished. 
about the means helping these actions came through into life. She is silent about 
the inner changes of heart, the world view, the joys, and consumption of life on 
the side of  the agents.
description of the quotidian hustle and bustle. Paradoxically, stories of the distant 
past appear more plausible if they are drawn up through a few leading features. 
We are inclined to think that in the past people’s words were only carved in stone, 
were motionless formations (Gestalten), etc.
Lotze discussed two conceptions of history in more specific terms: 
(1) Lessing’s thesis that the purpose of history is the education of humanity. 
This conception is not that bad since Lotze too was convinced that the purpose of 
human spiritual life consists in the richness of harmonic education. Besides, it 
considers education as concerned with the concrete, living person. 
(2) Hegel’s thesis that history is a development of the idea of humanity; every 
development is a realization of this idea. All things which do not conform to this 
idea are declared superficial. 
The first problem with Hegel’s thesis is that no one can say where humanity, or 
the world-spirit (Weltgeist), is. The second, even more serious problem is that this 
conception neglects the  individual  life of persons.  Further, it neglects women 
and writes history of the male society only.
leads an a-historic life. This fact is totally neglected by Hegel and his friends. 
Thirdly, Lotze criticized Hegel’s claim that the world-spirit can lead the agents of 
history unconsciously. This is a form of mysticism which disagrees with the spirit 
of scientific philosophy that Lotze respected most. 
Political Philosophy 
In Chapter 5 of Book 8, “The Public Life and Society”, Lotze discussed social ra-
tionalization, power, bureaucracy, national values, sovereignty, and international 
relations. Above all, he defended the enlightened, hereditary monarchy. Indeed, 
under present conditions it offers “the greatest security for steady development”—
concrete man, with his feelings and imagination, Lotze defended paternal patriot-
ism. He preferred the love for the fatherland over the love for the state.  Lotze 
criticized the view that the State itself should exist for its own sake alone. He also 
distrusted parliamentary representation and party politics. 
Lotze repudiated Plato’s model of the state in the form of a human body and 
accepted instead the political equilibrium achieved as “the result of the reciprocal 
 In matters of international law, he, the defender of 
plural values, was a proponent of a cosmopolitan balance of sovereign states: 
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“The increasing relations between the different divisions of humankind changed in 
great measure the significance of the political boundaries and gave new stimulus 
to the idea of cosmopolitanism”.  
Lotze disparaged those critics of modernity who claimed that its proponents 
only defend their desire for material well-being. Further, he adhered to the  
principles of the classical bourgeois liberalism but criticized the “Manchester 
liberalism” in what today is called the paradox of liberalism: Liberalism (Lotze 
did not use the term) fails to show how an isolated human being can be a subject 
of rights. Indeed, right is a reciprocal, and so collective, concept: “one’s right is 
what the others feel for us as a duty”.  
Lotze criticized the concept of natural law of the mainstream Western philoso-
phers and had sympathies with the historicist conception of law of Leopold von 
Ranke and Friedrich von Savigny. He used to say that “the beginning of all le-
gitimacy is illegitimate, although it need not be at the same time illegal”.  
Philosophy of Religion 
Religion was for Lotze a form of feeling of life (Lebensgefühl) in which the 
awareness of the fragility of the human race is connected with a conscience about 
a lay profession. Men know how modest their life-tasks are and nevertheless 
are happy to pursue them. This is a belief which follows the consciousness and the 
inner voice, and which, nevertheless, is exactly as certain as the knowledge we 
receive through the senses.  
Lotze criticizes the claim of the Enlightenment (e.g., of Hegel) that religion is 
only a product of human reason. If that was the case, then it would be possible to 
replace religion with philosophy. In truth, however, reason alone is not enough to 
grasp religious truth: we learn it through revelation which can be thought of as the 
historical action of God.  Lotze also criticizes Fries who compared religion, 
which starts from unproven truths, to science which is also ultimately based on 
unproved axioms we believe. Indeed, whereas the axioms of science are general 
and hypothetical judgments, the propositions of religion are assertoric. 
Historically, the world-religions started in the Orient, where the world (die 
Welt) was seen as a whole for the first time: it develops according to general laws. 
In the beginning, the Occident accepted this belief. Soon, however, it started to 
consider the world as something unfinished, giving opportunities to the individu-
als to form it according to the specific purposes of everyone. The future was seen 
as formless, so that human action can change reality in an absolutely new way.  
Embracing this view, the believers abandoned quietism and embraced vita activa. 
Reducing the horizons of human imagination to the practical tasks of the earthy 
world, the need to connect it with the transcendental waned. The result was the 
Pagans, in their most developed form of antiquity, believed in reason, in  
self-respect, and in the sublime. Lotze called this stance “a heroism of the pure 
reason”. In the pagan mind, nature plays a central role. Unfortunately, pagans 
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belief in progress and a turn away from God. From now on Godhood was consi- 
dered mainly in moral terms. The dogma and the cult waned. 
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failed to foster humaneness. This was the historical achievement of Christianity: a 
totally new understanding of the moral duties. Of course, pagans recognized moral 
duties too. However, they understood them as having the same necessity as natural 
laws have. In contrast, Christianity—especially Protestantism—taught its believ-
ers to carry out duties following their personal conscience. Because it established 
this immediate connection to God, Christianity made it possible for individual 
Christians to pursue their own values of preference. These are independent from 
the provenance of the individual and from her actual place in the society. In this 
way, the respect for persons’ dignity was secured. 
It is beyond doubt that, historically, Christianity realized the best schooling 
(Bildung) ever. Christianity, however, is not only a teaching.  It requires a faith-
dogmatics must be preserved and cultivated.  Of course, in the holy scriptures 
there are many ambiguities. These, however, result from the fact that the people of 
past times, when these scriptures were written down, had different notions about 
the world, law, and order than we today have. 
We must look upon Christian dogmatics as putting questions about the  
purpose of human life, not as giving answers. Lotze was confident that every new 
generation would return to these questions. Of course, dogmatics can be criticized: 
indeed, the critical Protestant theology was, historically, the best way to interpret 
God. But we must not cast Christian dogmatics away as obsolete. 
A main idea of Lotze’s metaphysics of religion was that “all the processes in 
nature are only understandable through the continuant involvement of God; only 
this involvement arranges the transition of the interaction [Übergang des Wech-
selwirkungs] between different parts of the world”.  Apparently, Lotze’s concept 
of God is a religious expression of the concept of metaphysical substance.  God 
is the foundation of reality; not in the sense of pantheism, however, but in the 
sense of creative power which is unthinkable without a living personality with its 
will—the person of God.  
The reason for this is that Lotze’s starting point in philosophy—the concept of 
humanity—does not have a generic character; we can grasp it only in terms of par-
ticular individuals, or persons.  This means that the person is the highest concept 
of the mind. The consequent carrying out of this concept leads to a full-fledged  
concept of God–person. God is something of an ideal of persons, their standard. 
We cannot prove Him, but we must believe in Him. 
Epilogue 
In the lines above I have tried to outline the main ideas of Hermann Lotze’s  
work is most illuminating to the correct understanding of Lotze’s development as 
a philosopher. It worked out in detail some theses already formulated in his earlier 
works, Metaphysics (1841) and Logic (1843), but in rudimentary and rough form. 
In the Microcosm Lotze thus made them sophisticated enough that he could use 
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them with elegance and precision in his System of Philosophy (1874/9). In  
particular, the author elaborated the inner connection between philosophical logic 
and anthropology, logicizing in this way, many intimate problems of the human 
soul, mind, and action. His convoluted and intensive program was filled with so many 
ideas that it could give inspiration to the leading world-philosophies of the twenti-
eth century: (1) Analytic Philosophy; (2) Phenomenology; (3) Pragmatism; (4) 
Hermeneutics; and the (5) Philosophy of Life.
References 
brödler, Berlin (1st ed 1866). 
der Psychoanalyse auf die Geisteswissenschaften 2: 238–41. 
Nature. The Free Press, New York. 
G Schmidt (ed). Melzer, Darmstadt (1 st ed 1784/91). 
Basel cols 258–62. 
Berlin.
Edwards (ed). Macmillan, London, pp 121–25. 
Weiße. Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie 8: 1–24. In: Lotze 
Leipzig.
Menschheit, Versuch einer Anthropologie vol 1, Hirzel, Leipzig. 
Anzeigen 199: 1977–92. In Lotze 1885/91 iii, pp 303–14. 
115
Hermann Lotze’s Microcosm
vol 5. Bautz, Herzburg cols 270–77. 
1885/91 i, pp 86–108. 
Erdmann J E (1930) Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, F. Clemens (ed). Eigen-
Ferenczi S (1913) Aus der Psychologie von Lotze, Imago. Zeitschrift für Anwendungen 
Fernándes-Armesto F (2001) Civilizations: Culture, Ambition, and the Transformation of 
Herder J G (1966)  Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit (4 parts),  
Hauser K (2003) Lotze and Husserl, Archiv für die Geschichte der Philosophie 85: 152–
78.
Humboldt A (1845/62), Kosmos (5 vols) Cotta, Stuttgart. 
the University of Louvain, Belgium, transcription by R Parpan, 42 pages.
Husserl E (1895/7) Lotze—Microcosmos, Manuscript KI 59 of the  Husserl Archives at 
Kettern B (1993) Lotze, Rudolf Hermann. Biographisch-Bibliographisches Kirchenlexikon 
Lasslop P (1974) Gemüt. Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie vol 3.  Schwabe & Co, 
Lehmann G (1931) Geschichte der nachkantische Philosophie. Junker und Dünnhaupt,  
Levy D (1967) Macrocosm and Microcosm. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy vol 5, P  
Lotze H (1841a) Metaphysik. Weidmann, Leipzig. 
Lotze H (1841b) Bemerkungen über den Begriff des Raumes. Sendeschreiben an CH 
Lotze H (1852) Medicinische Psychologie, oder Physiologie der Seele. Weidmann,  
Lotze H (1856a) Mikrokosmus: Ideen zur Naturgeschichte und Geschichte der 
Lotze H (1856b) Selbstanzeige des ersten Bandes des Mikrokosmus. Göttinger gelehrte 
Lotze H (1858) Mikrokosmus vol 2. Hirzel, Leipzig. 
Lotze H (1857) Streitschriften, 1. Heft. Hirzel, Leipzig. 
Lotze H (1874) Logik. Hirzel, Leipzig. 
Lotze H (1879) Metaphysik. Hirzel, Leipzig. 
Lotze H (1864) Mikrokosmus vol 3. Hirzel, Leipzig. 
60      Nikolay Milkov 
nd edn. 
th edn. 
burg.
14: 133–53. 
istischer Philosophie und neuzeitlichem Positivismus. Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main. 
Mensch und die Wissenschaften vom Mensch vol 1. Solaris, Innsbruck, pp 371–82. 
hundert. Dilthey-Jahrbuch 2: 140–58. 
phiebegriffs im 19. Jahrhundert. Alber, Freiburg, pp 7–23. 
In: J Speck (ed) Grundprobleme der grossen Philosophen. Philosophie der Neuzeit IV 
Neumann, Würzburg. 
Social Life and Change. Pennsylvania State University Press.
cago.
für philosophische Forschung 52: 522–41. 
of Lotze in Anglophone Philosophy. Prima philosophia 16: 261–78. 
th edn K Oesterreich 
st
Rouge.
philosophische Kritik 47: 272–315. 
Hermann Lotze’s Philosophical Anthropology. History of the Human Sciences 9: 
1–26.
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, pp 9–51. 
zig.
Lotze H (1881) Grundzüge der Psychologie. Diktate aus dem Vorlesungen. Hirzel, Leip-
Lotze H (1885/91) Kleine Schriften 4 vols, D Peipers (ed). Hirzel, Leipzig. 
Lotze H (1912) Logik, G Misch (ed). Meiner, Leipzig, 2
Lotze H (1923) Mikrokosmos 3 vols, R Schmidt (ed). Meiner, Leipzig, 6
Lotze H (2003) Briefe und Dokumente, R Pester (ed). Königshausen & Neumann, Würz-
Milkov N (2000) Lotze and the Early Cambridge Analytic Philosophy. Prima philosophia 
Misch G (1912) Einleitung. In: Lotze 1912, pp ix–cxxii. 
Nugebauer M (2002) Lotze und Ritschl: Reich-Gottes-Theologie zwischen nachideal-
für Philosophie und Wissenschaft der Gegenwart. In: G Frey and J Zelger (eds) Der 
Orth E W (1983) Der Anthropologiebegriff Rudolf Hermann Lotzes und seine Bedeutung 
Orth E W (1984a) Dilthey und Lotze, Zur Wandlung des Philosophiebegriffs im 19 Jahr-
Orth E W (1984b) Einleitung. In: EW Orth (ed) Dilthey und der Wandlung des Philoso-
Orth E W (1986) R. H. Lotze: Das Ganze unseres Welt- und Selbstverständnisses. 
Pester R (1997) Hermann Lotze. Wege seines Denkens und Forschens, Königshausen & 
Schatzki T (2002) The Site of the Social: A Philosophical Account of the Constitution of 
Scheler M (1997) Gesammelte Werke vol 15. M Frings (ed). Bouvier, Bonn. 
Schmidt R (1923) Vorwort des Herausgebers. In: Lotze 1923, pp vii–xxv. 
Smith B (1994) Austrian Philosophy. The Legacy of Franz Brentano. Open Court, Chi-
Smith B (1998) Ontologie des Mesocosmos. Soziale Objekte und Umwelten. Zeitschrift 
Stambovsky P (2003) Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen (§ 59) and the Marginalization 
(ed). Mittler, Berlin (1  ed 1863/68). 
Ueberweg F (1916) Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, 11
Voegelin E (1956/87) Order and History 5 vols. University of Louisiana Press, Baton 
Weiße C (1865) Rezension von Mikrokosmus by H Lotze. Zeitschrift für Philosophie und 
Woodward W R (1996) Inner Migration or Disguised Reform? Political Interests of 
   61 
Anthropology.
  Schmidt 1923, pp vii–viii.
  For an alternative guess see Stambovsky 2003.
fluence on Husserl see Hauser 2003. By the way, Husserl prepared an extensive manuscript 
on Lotze’s Microcosm, which he intended to include as an Appendix to his Logical Investi-
gations (see Husserl 1895/7) Unfortunately, this manuscript is still unpublished.
  What these other things are we shall see in §§ 9 and 10.
  Lotze 1858, pp 381–89. Here, and in what follows, Lotze’s Microcosm is quoted ac-
cording to his sixth edition (Lotze 1923).
  All three works were published as contributions to R Wagner, Handwörterbuch der 
Physiologie mit Rücksicht auf die physiologische Pathologie, 4 volumes (Braunschweig: 
Vieweg, 1842/53).
  Levy 1976, p 122.
Ibid.
  Lotze 1856a, p 452.
  Lotze 1923, p 362. See also § 11, paragraph 2.
  For a detailed discussion see Pester 1997, pp 201–02.
  Lotze 2003, pp 229–30. On the formal side, Lotze accepted this project “since it re-
quires multifarious reflections, and this is very good for someone like me who is habituated 
to more abstract range of thoughts” (p 230). Apparently, Lotze sought a change in the style 
of this work—and this change was fruitful indeed.
Ibid, p 257.
  Pester 1997, p 150.
Ibid, p 204; pp 151f.
  Voegelin 1956/87.
  Schatzki 2002.
trian philosophy. This is not a surprise if we keep in mind that Austrian philosophy, or the 
School of Franz Brentano, was massively influenced by Lotze.
  Lotze 1923, p 428.
Ibid, p 429.
interesting to the psychoanalysts. Sandor Ferenczi, for example, found out that in his  
Psychology (Lotze 1881), Lotze formulated, in a theoretical way, propositions which 
“manifest such an agreement with the psychological conception of psychoanalysis, reached in an 
empirical way, that we can consider their author as one of the forerunners of Freud’s ideas.” 
(Ferenczi 1913, p 238)
rediscovered in Axel Honneth’s Kampf um Anerkennung: zur moralischen Grammatik 
sozialer Konflikte (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1992).
  Lotze 1923, p 349.
Ibid, p 353.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
Hermann Lotze’s Microcosm
  Max Scheler has called it “a classical monument of the philosophical literature”  (see 
Lotze 1923, p 435. The struggle for recognition is a Hegelian theme, recently 
  Incidentally, this point of Microcosm, repeated in Lotze’s later works, made him  
For Lotze’s influence on the early analytic philosophers see Milkov 2000; for his in-
The book’s subtitle is: Ideas towards a Natural History of Humanity: Essay on  
Smith 1994, p 3. This, according to Barry Smith, is one of the characteristics of Aus-
Scheler 1997, p 133).
Notes
62      Nikolay Milkov 
Ibid, p 356.
  Smith 1998.
  Fernández-Armesto 2002, p 14.
30   Orth 1983, p 378.
shows the same theoretical attitude.
  Lotze 1864, Book 7, Chapter 5.
nations, and more or less drew from their juice”. Herder 1784/91, p 437.
  Lotze 1856b, p 304.
Ibid, p 308.
the same sense GE Moore and Bertrand Russell were at the beginning of the 20th century.
  Ueberweg 1916, p 272.
  Lotze 1856b, p 306.
  In this sense Microcosm was a philosophy of history. It, however, is not to be  
confused with the historical theory of the time (of Leopold von Ranke, Johann Gustav 
Droysen) which Lotze severely criticized. See on this § 16. Ibid, pp 310–11.
  See 1874, § 208; 1879, pp 179 f; Misch 1912, p xciv; Lehmann 1931, p 144.
  Lotze 1864, p 241.
Wittgenstein in their discovery of the region of silence beyond the foundations of calcula-
tive logic.
was embraced by Bertrand Russell and Rudolf Carnap. See Bertrand Russell, Our
Knowledge of the External World (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1914); Rudolf Carnap, 
Der logische Aufbau der Welt (Berlin: Weltkreis, 1928).
  Lotze 1856b, p 310.
Ibid, p 306.
geois knowledge” already in his small Metaphysics. (1841a, p 17)
nored Lotze’s use of heart (Gemüt) and instead spoke of mind (Geist). (see Weiße 1865, 
passim) This fact shows how unusual the use of this concept was at the time.
  See Lasslop 1974.
  To this purpose he also introduced, and widely used, the concept of coloring:  
“An immense color intensity of our lively, concrete world examination grants an endless 
Frege who, apparently, borrowed it from Lotze.
  Quotation according to Pester 1997, p 255.
  On the joint program for new, concrete philosophy of Lotze and Dilthey, see Orth 
1984a, 1984b.
Marx, who was only one year younger than Lotze.
  Orth 1986, p 43.
  Lotze 1843, p 40.
expression that can be perceived by the senses”.
27
28
29
31
32
33
Ibid, p 305.
49
48
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
occupation” (Lotze 1923, p 383). Today we connect the concept of coloring mainly with 
  Cf. with a similar conception, but developed in completely different key, of Karl 
Ibid, p 82. Cf. with Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, 3.1: “In a proposition a thought finds an 
It is curious that in his review of Microcosm, Lotze’s teacher, Christian Weiße, ig-
Lotze criticized the division between “speculative knowledge” and “general bour-
Pester 1997, p 219. This point was followed by both Gottlob Frege and Ludwig 
It deserves notice that Lotze was critical to speculations in philosophy in exactly 
Lotze’s examination of the relation between men and women, discussed in § 2, 
“The Jews are like a parasitic plant, which attached itself to almost all European 
The idea that we can understand the world only if we understand its construction 
   63 
 
 
  Orth 1986, p 48. 
Methuen, 1959) that the material bodies, identified in space and time, are the basic indi-
viduals; every other individual can be identified referring to them. 
Pester, p 119. 
  Ibid, p 133. 
  Ibid, p 134. 
  Lotze 1923, p 287. 
psychology as developed in his The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson, 1949). 
  Lotze 1856a, pp 238 f. 
  Lotze 1852, pp 77 f. 
“logical constructions” developed in Our Knowledge of the External World. 
  Lotze 2003, “Letter to Apelt, 25.6.37”, pp 89 f. 
ture. Kant himself was not so clear on this point. In Monadologia physica (1756) he said 
that monads are not in space, rather, they fill the space. But in the Critique of Pure Reason 
(especially in its second edition) Kant was more atomistic. 
  Lotze 1856a, p 39. 
metaphors in the world of cosmos. Ibid, p 402. 
Morgenröte im Aufgang, Dresden, 1634. 
  Lotze 1864, p 574. 
the help of which we tried to abolish philosophical illusions, are misleading (TS 213,  
p 418). Wittgenstein came to this conclusion in the second half of the 1930s when he realized 
that his conception of language as a calculus, that he held in the early 1930s, is misleading. 
  See Pester 1997, p 110. 
  See Lotze 1841b, pp 103 f. 
(Darmstadt: Reichl, 1928). 
  Lotze 1923, p 72. 
Franklin. 
  Lotze 1923, p 262. 
Amsterdam: Rodopi. 
  Lotze 1923, p 266. 
  See Weiße 1865, pp 289 f. 
  Lotze 1923, p 424. 
  Ibid, p 443. 
 
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
Hermann Lotze’s Microcosm
Upper Lusatia (Oberlausitz)), more than two centuries before him,  in his Aurora oder 
  Lotze 2003, “Letter to Apelt 18.2.37”, pp 85 f. 
tional induction from Fries” (Woodward 1996, p 5).
  On this point Lotze was close to philosophers of the Enlightenment like Benjamin 
  This theme is central in Max Scheler, Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos 
  A concept widely used by Lotze’s fellow countryman Jacob Böhme (both come from
  Here and in the next paragraph we see examples of how Lotze used microcosmic 
  Fichte and Schelling were also against accepting atoms into the philosophy of na-
  Pester 1997, p 42. “[Lotze] drew important concepts of maxims, values and even ra-
  Lotze 1856a, pp 328 f. Cf with Bertrand Russell’s conception of external objects as 
  Lotze, 1856a, p 304. Cf. with Strawsons’s claim from his Individuals (London: 
  Cf.  with my Kaleidoscopic Mind: An Essay in Post-Wittgensteinian Philosophy, 
  This point of Lotze’s reminds us of Wittgenstein’s claim that even his similes, with 
  Cf. with Gilbert Ryle’s criticism of the uncritical use of  physical concepts in  
  The German Idealists refused to see the world as given. For them, it was a problem. 
64      Nikolay Milkov 
 
antropologische Studie (Munich: Beck, 2003). 
Gesammelte Schriften, R Tiedemann and H Schweppenhäuser (eds), vols 1, 2, 1974, pp 693 f. 
  See how Lotze’s discussion relates to burning issues today. 
  Lotze 1923, p 345. 
  Ibid, p 346. 
Lotze 150 years ago, to the conditio humana of today. The problem was discussed, for ex-
ample, in Robert Nozick, The examined life: philosophical meditations (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1989). 
  Lotze 1923, pp 437–38. 
In Historische Variationen (Munich: Beck, 2003), pp 23–30 (1st edn 1985). 
History (Oxford: Clarendon, 1946). 
  Lotze 1923, p 343. 
  Ibid, p 344. 
from Annalen. 
of today. One author had recently noted that “[t]he book [Microcosm] probably had follow-
ing among educated women”. In support of this surmise he also referred to the fact that it 
was translated into English by two women: Elizabeth Hamilton and EE Constance Jones. 
(Woodward 1996, p 17). 
  Lotze 1864, p 444. 
patriotism” (of Jürgen Habermas). 
  Lotze 1864, p 423. 
  Ibid, p 436. 
  Ibid, p 427. 
  Ibid, p 417. 
  Lotze 1923, pp 447 f. 
  Lotze 1864, p 546. 
Christianity is nothing but a moral teaching. We can discover similar claims also by Kant. 
and Melanchton, who made concessions to the dogmas of the church, losing in this way the 
moral essence of Christianity. His theology, however, also opposed rationalism and was for 
a “positive evangelical teaching”. Above all, it rehabilitated the old idea of the Kingdom of 
God, putting it at the center of theology (see Neugebauer 2002, p 27). Ritschl believed that, 
reformed this way, theology would be made to correspond to the spiritual needs of moder-
nity. 
  Lotze 1864, p 364. 
their interaction, to an underlying community of entities, which, in its turn, is based on an 
 
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
  Ibid, p 331. 108
109
110
111
112
  Lotze 1864, p 281, pp 245–47. It is astonishing how close these lines are, written by 
conservative-Lutheran and confessional theology of the time. Ritschl criticized both Luther 
  Cf. with Robin Collingwood’s philosophy of history as developed in his The Idea of 
  See Pester 1997, p 335. By the way, “Lotze’s endeavour to lead all things back, in 
  In this Lotze was followed by his contemporary Albrecht Ritschl who was against the 
  Many of Lotze’s contemporaries, say Leo Tolstoy (1828–1910), claimed that  
  Lotze 1864, pp 47 ff. On this point Lotze appears as a predecessor of the feminism 
  Ibid, p 46. Cf with Sebastian Haffner, “Was ist eigentlich Geschichte?”  
  Lotze 1864, p 363. Cf with Ernst Tugendhat, Egozentrizität und Mystik: eine 
  In this way he quasi opposed to the today fashionable principle of “constitutional  
  This stance was developed in the 1920s, and later, by Marc Bloch and his friends 
  Cf. with Walter Benjamin, Über den Begriff der Geschichte, 1942. In:  
   65 
infinite mental and personal substance, was defined as teleological monism.” (Kettern 
  Lotze 1864, pp 587 ff.
Ibid, p 52.
would like to thank Reinhard Pester. 
113
114
115
Hermann Lotze’s Microcosm
For his helpful comments on the material contained in an early draft of this paper, I 
1993, p 272).
